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13. The United Kingdom. Hybrid Populisms, Mixed Fortunes, and Unstable Support 
 
James Stanyer, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen 
 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom has traditionally not witnessed examples of successful populist parties 
in the way that they have been observed in many continental European countries. The recent 
success of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) at a number of elections, 
however, has led some to claim that there is a growing populist influence in politics (Fella, 
2008). This chapter reviews the literature on populist political communication, identifying 
the main actors and what has been said about them. 
 
Research on Populism in the United Kingdom 
There is no consensus on defining populism in the United Kingdom. Moffitt 
DQG7RUPH\SDUJXHWKDWLWLV³DQD[LRPDWLFIHDWXUHRI literature on the topic to 
DFNQRZOHGJHWKHFRQWHVWHGQDWXUHRISRSXOLVP´ with the term populism being used 
interchangeably with extreme right, the radical right, Euroskepticism, and various 
combinations of these terms. Most scholars focus on subtypes of populism, such as right-wing 
extremism (Eatwell, 2004; Goodwin, 2011; Pupcenoks & McCabe, 2013; Startin, 2014) and 
Euroskepticism (Gifford, 2006). Left-wing populism, in comparison, is largely overlooked, 
the term being more often linked to the political right (Baggini, 2013, p. 131). Studies of 
populism in the United Kingdom draw on a range of research methods, including discourse 
analysis (Atkins & Finlayson, 2013; Edwards 2012), content analysis (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 
2011), interviews (Rhodes, 2009), network analysis (Kim, Rademakers, Sanchez, & van 
9XFKW2¶&DOODJKDQ Greene, Conway, Carthy, & Cunningham, 2013), and surveys 
(Borisyuk, Rallings, Thrasher, & van der Kolk, 2007; John & Margetts, 2009; Whitaker 
& Lynch, 2011). 
 
In this chapter, we have included politicians and parties that the literature defines as populist 
but have excluded smaller players, such as the Populist Alliance and Britain First, given their 
very limited presences in the UK media and politics. We have selected four key populist 
actors. The Euroskeptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is regularly called 
populist (see, e.g., Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2012; Hayton, 2010; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011), 
as is the British National Party (BNP) (see, e.g., Akkerman, 2011), although others call the 
BNP fascist with populist overtones (Goodwin, 2014; Mammone, 2009). The Respect Party 
and English Defence League (EDL) have also been labeled populist (see Bartlett & Littler, 
2011; Clark, Bottom, & Copus, 2008). 
 
As noted above, most British scholarship focuses on specific subtypes of populism. Only 
Clark et al. (2008) compare left- and right-wing populism in the Respect Party and the British 
National Party. Applying 7DJJDUW¶V (2000) taxonomy of populist actors, they find a common 
core of populist characteristics shared by the two parties, which take different forms 
depending on the host ideology. Given the limited possible cases in the United Kingdom, 
&ODUNHWDO¶VFRPSDUDWLYHVWXG\LVXQIRUWXQDWHO\ unable to consider party size or position of 
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power as variables. Many of the similarities identified²direct communication, anti-system 
challenges, locally adaptable campaigns, adopting the role of the underdog²may be 
affected by these factors. 
 
,QWHUPVRI-DJHUVDQG:DOJUDYH¶VW\SRORJ\8.,P and the BNP could best be 
described as complete populists. Each makes reference and appeals to the people, is anti-
elitist, and calls for the exclusion of EU migrants. The EDL could best be described as 
excluding populist. It makes reference and appeals to the people and calls for the exclusion of 
out-groups, namely Muslims. The Respect Party could best be described as anti-elitist 
populist. It makes reference and appeals to the people and is highly critical of the political 
establishment. It was founded LQUHVSRQVHWRWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V involvement in Iraq. 
 
The extent of support for these actors varies. UKIP support is on the rise. Founded in the early 
1990s, in reaction to the EU Maastricht Treaty, it fought its first European parliamentary 
election in 1994. In the 1999 European parliamentary election it gained its first member of the 
European Parliament (MEP), and by the 2014 European elections, it secured 27% of the vote 
and 23 MEPs. In the local government elections the same year, it gained 163 seats across a 
number of local councils. The party now has its highest number of members since its 
foundation, an estimated 42,000. In LQWKHFRXQWU\¶VJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQLWJDLQHGRQH03
in the national parliament and received more than 12% of the national vote, almost twice the 
level of the Liberal Democrats, and four times that of the Scottish Nationalist Party. This 
support is largely based in England. 
 
7KH%ULWLVK1DWLRQDO3DUW\¶VVXSSRUWLQFRQWUDVWVHHPVWREHRQWKH wane. The party formed 
in the early 1980s and reached the peak of its electoral success in 2009 when it gained two 
MEPs and 55 councilors in local government elections, including in the London Assembly. 
However, in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, it lost both its MEPs, including 
the party leader Nick Griffin, and was left with only two councilors. Party membership also 
declined and is now estimated to be around 500. In the same year, Nick Griffin, leader since 
1999, lost a party leadership contest and was later thrown out of the party. The BNP only 
received less than two percent of the vote in the 2010 general election and had much less 
support in the 2015 general election. 
 
The EDL, formed in 2009, is a movement, not a political party. It has no formal membership 
and does not stand in elections. As such, it is difficult to determine how much support the 
EDL has. One estimate was that it had 20,000±30,000 supporters in 2010 (Bartlett and Littler, 
2011). However, the arrest and resignation of its leader, Tommy Robinson, in 2013 may have 
UHGXFHGWKHPRYHPHQW¶VPRPHQWXP 
 
The Respect Party was formed in 2004 in the wake of the Iraq war, and while it has enjoyed 
some electoral success, its support also seems on the wane. Unlike the other populist parties, 
it is on the left, and its support comes in the main from ethnic minority voters, especially from 
Muslim communities in major urban conurbations (Borisyuk et al., 2007). The party won its 
first local council seat in 2004 and its first MP, George Galloway (the party leader), in the 
2005 general election. By 2007, the party had 18 local councilors in England. A split in the 
party and a series of local government election losses, however, meant that by 2015, the party 
had no local councilors, and George Galloway lost his Bradford West parliamentary seat in 
the general election. The Respect Party also had little support in the 2015 general election. 
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As will be discussed later in the chapter, the literature points to a range of contextual factors 
that underlie the success of populist political actors. The first is a deep dissatisfaction with the 
main political parties (Ford et al., 2012; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011) and a cynicism about, and 
distrust of, the political establishment (Hayton, 2010). The second is industrial decline and 
high unemployment (Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014). Third, the perceived level of 
inward migration from outside the United Kingdom (Ford et al., 2012; Whitaker & Lynch, 
2011). Fourth, the changing culture and values, and concern about the influence of Islam and 
Muslims on British life (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Goodwin, Cutts, & Janta-Lipinski, 2014). 
And the fifth factor is UK government policy. The Respect Party benefited from a backlash 
against UK involvement in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, particuODUO\DPRQJ%ULWDLQ¶V
Muslim population. Although not discussed in the literature, other factors, like electoral 
systems and party finances, may also play an important role. 
 
Populist Actors as Communicators 
The literature on populist actors in the United Kingdom is somewhat sketchy and colored by 
the UK context: Populists constitute small opposition parties with limited chance of governing 
in the current electoral system, and radical right populism in ethnocentric or Euroskeptic 
forms dominates. 
 
A number of populist stylistic features stand out in the UK literature. The first is the 
juxtaposition of the elite and the people. Populist actors present themselves as the voice of the 
silent majority, speaking the direct, politically incorrect language of the common man, pitched 
against an oppressive or unresponsive elite (on measuring this feature of populism in the 
United Kingdom, see Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). In the United Kingdom, however, a 
number of studies identify this characteristic of anti-elitist populism in mainstream parties, too 
(see, e.g., Baggini, 2013; Bale, 2013). The second feature is the construction of otherness. 
Right-wing populists in the United Kingdom identify a range of out-groups, especially 
immigrants. In the case of UKIP, this is combined with Euroskepticism. The third is anti-
system challenges. There is theoretical disagreement on whether populism is opposed to 
representative democracy per se (Taggart, 2000) or whether, more specifically, it rejects the 
principles and procedures that define liberal democracies, such as the separation of powers, 
respect for minorities, and so on (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013). A direct democratic promise is 
inherent LQSRSXOLVP¶VDQWL-system challenges (Mammone, 2009; Painter, 2013). This 
distinguishes it from undemocratic forms of extremism. The final feature is the use of 
simplistic and emotionally laden messages. Populist rhetoric uses simple language and seeks 
to arouse emotions such as fear and indignation (Fieschi & Heywood, 2004, p. 291; Taggart, 
2000, p. 101). 
 
The strategic use of charismatic leadership is also seen as a dominant feature of populism in 
the UK literature (Taggart, 2000, pp. 102±103; Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2013), if not a 
defining one. Empirical studies agree on the importance of charismatic leadership to 
SRSXOLVWV¶VXFFHVV*HRUJH Galloway, leader of the Respect Party, was found to use charisma 
to patch up contradictory arguments (Clark et al., 2008; Crines, 2013). Former EDL leader 
Tommy Robinson and former UKIP leader-in-waiting Robert Kilroy Silk were found to use 
charisma to gain media coverage and obtain internal party cohesion (on the EDL, see Oaten, 
2014; on the UKIP, see Fella, 2008). ,QWKHFDVHRIWKH%ULWLVK1DWLRQDO3DUW\¶V1LFN*ULIILQ
results showed that his lack of charisma had a negative impact on media coverage and party 
cohesion (Startin, 2014, pp. 291±292; Eatwell, 2004). Current UKIP leader Nigel Farage has 
reinvented himself as an outsider, despite an elite background of private school and City of 
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London stockbroking. No studies that we could find compared charismatic leadership in 
populist and mainstream parties in the United Kingdom. 
 
There is a gap in the literature (in particular, in theoretical studies) on SRSXOLVWDFWRUV¶
approach to the media. Most empirical investigations H[DPLQHWKH%ULWLVK1DWLRQDO3DUW\¶V
media strategy and its attempt to both shed its former neo-Nazi image and to openly (if 
unsuccessfully) adopt a ³PRUHSRSXOLVW´UKHWRULF1LFN*ULIILQDVFLWHGLQ)HOODS
193). With mainstream media, the BNP tries to strike a difficult balance: It uses ³FRGHG´
messages to simultaneously gain mainstream support and reassure old hard-liners that the 
extremist stance remains within (Eatwell, 2004, p. 63). Another strand of research interrogates 
PDLQVWUHDPSROLWLFLDQV¶VWUDWHJLF communication and finds that they use a populist style to 
strategically adapt their message to the medium when approaching tabloid media (e.g., 
Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Fella, 2008). 
 
The literature is somewhat skewed by its focus on mainstream parties and the British National 
Party: The former make their communication style more extreme in their relations with 
popular media, whereas the latter tones down radical rhetoric to appeal to mainstream voters. 
Yet these cases do not represent the breadth of populism in the United Kingdom and the 
complexity of its relations with the media. Furthermore, the lack of theory on both media 
populism and populist media strategy make such generalizations unrepresentative. 
 
As far as we can tell, there are no comparative studies of populist and mainstream party 
communication in the United Kingdom. However, a significant body of literature agrees on 
PDLQVWUHDPSDUWLHV¶IODLUIRUSRSXOLVW communication. This aptitude is found to be more 
pronounced in the United Kingdom than in other European cases studied, possibly due to the 
competitive two-party system (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014, p. 568). 
 
Various scholars have studied different aspects of populist communication in New Labour 
and the Conservative Party: populist discourse and style (e.g., Fella, 2008; Hoggett, 
Wilkinson, & Beedell, 2013), the adoption of what are considered typical populist issues (e.g., 
Bale, 2013), and the use of populist ideology (Atkins & Finlayson, 2013). Paradoxically, such 
populist strategies in British mainstream parties appear to create opportunities for truly 
populist parties. As Baggini (2013) and Hoggett, Wilkinson, and Beedell (2013) explain, from 
the perspective of political consumerism, populist strategies have the adverse effect of casting 
too wide a net. The result is a gap for small populist parties to pitch themselves as parties of 
conviction and sincerity framed in an anti-establishment narrative by using more extreme 
rhetoric on single issues where they have a distinctive position. In this sense, party size and 
election prospects also play a role in determining which parts of the populist communication 
toolbox a party chooses to adopt. Such factors require further investigation in comparative 
studies that will be able to shed light on the role of the British electoral system, which 
favors established parties. 
 
The Media and Populism 
The most striking feature of the literature about media and populism in the 
United Kingdom is its patchy nature. Although the literature covers different 
dimensions of the media/populism nexus, studies tend to deal with a 
specific populist party or its use of a specific technological platform (most 
often social media). These glimpses into populism and the roles of both 
media organizations and communication technologies in regard to it do not 
amount to a broad, in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. 
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A meagre amount of literature deals with the way media outlets cover 
populist groups or populist discourse (Akkerman, 2011;). That said, these 
170 James Stanyer, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen 
studies help challenge the widespread belief that newspapers might contribute 
to the success of populist actors by giving these groups a voice and 
even supporting their rhetoric. Akkerman (2011, p. 12), for example, tests 
WKHFODLPWKDWSRSXODUQHZVSDSHUVKDYHDVWURQJHUWHQGHQF\³WRVKDUHWKH 
anti-HVWDEOLVKPHQWSRVLWLRQRISRSXOLVWSDUWLHV´E\FRPSDULQJWDEORLGVLQ 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. He concludes tKDW³WKHUHLVQR 
evidence that popular newspapers share an anti-elitist bias with populist 
SDUWLHV´ 
A study by Cardo (2014) looks further at the representation of populist 
figure George Galloway in the context of a reality TV program, Celebrity 
Big Brother, in 2006. Beyond the analysis of coverage, Copsey and Macklin 
SH[DPLQHWKHPHGLD¶VUROHLQWKHULVHRIWKH%ULWLVK1DWLRQDO 
Party. Media contributions are analyzed along three dimensions; namely, 
the opportunity the media gives the party (a) to drop the barriers of entry 
into the electoral market by enabling it to communicate with a wide audience, 
(b) to bestow respectability and legitimacy upon newcomers, and (c) to 
provide 
momentum by giving the impression of a mass following. 
There are suggestions in the literature that the media themselves engage 
in populism (see Stanyer, 2007). Wayne and Murray (2009), in examining 
which political actors dominate the UK TV coverage, also investigated the 
extent to which British news is cynical or populist. Cynicism and populism 
DUHKHUHWDNHQDVV\QRQ\PVDQGUHIHUWRWKHWHQGHQF\WR³XQGHUHPSKDVL]H 
µVXEVWDQWLYH¶WKHPHVVXFKDVSROLF\LVVXHVWRIRFXVRQOHVVLPSRUWDQWWKHPHV 
VXFKDVSRSXODULW\FRQIOLFWVWUDWHJ\WDFWLFVDQGSHUVRQDOLWLHV´S 
6RPHDXWKRUVPDNHVWURQJVWDWHPHQWVDERXWWKHPHGLD¶VUROHLQWKHULVH 
of ideologies often associated with populist groups, such as Islamophobia 
(Ansari, 2012) and racism (Bates, 2012). Despite the suggestion that the 
media have a key function in providing the stage on which ideas and discourses 
E\SRSXOLVWJURXSVDUHDLUHGDQG³QRUPDOL]HG´QRFULWLFDODSSURDFK 
has been developed to assess how the media would actually assume this role. 
Strong evidence²empirical or otherwise²is all too often missing. 
Bale, Kessel, and Taggart (2011) find that the term populism is used by 
British newspapers to refer to a variety of topics and actors that might have 
little in common with each other. Populist topics, for example, can range 
from calls for social justice to Islamophobia, while populist leaders might 
include politicians like Silvio Berlusconi and Gordon Brown. 
Although there are comparative studies involving the United Kingdom, 
they do not really lead to a systematic identification of the reasons why there 
are differences in the media/populism relationship across European countries. 
Rather than explaining the differences, these studies tend to describe 
WKHP2¶&DOODJKDQHWDO 
When it comes to non-journalistic online media, the focus of interest 
appears to be in the use of social media by populist actors, particularly by 
the EDL. There is a widespread assumption that the Internet, particularly 
VRFLDOPHGLDLVD³ILWWLQJ´WRROIRUSRSXOLVWDFWRUV$V%DUWOHWWGLVFXVVLQJWKH 
link between social media and populism, puts it: 
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The medium fits the message; it is distributed, non-hierarchical and 
democratic. It is an alternative to the mainstream media. It is not 
controlled by the elites and content is generated by the honest, hardworking, 
ordinary citizens, exactly the people who the populists are 
defending. (2014, pp. 93±94) 
Atton (2006) analyzes the BNPonline discourse and concludes that the BNPpractices 
DQRQOLQH³DXWKRULWDULDQSRSXOLVP´7KLVLVH[SUHVVHGGLVFXUVLYHO\ 
through symbols²³DPythic past, a repressed present and a secure future 
IRUWKHLQQRFHQW´²ZKLFKGUDZRQWKH³OLYHGH[SHULHQFHV´RIWKH%ULWLVK 
1DWLRQDO3DUW\¶VPHPEHUV$WWRQSS±586). As part of the interest 
in the way populists operate online, there are studies applying network 
analysis, particularly on Twitter data, to map the exchanges among activists. 
Kim et al. (2013), for example, mapped the digital network of the EDL by 
examining the Twitter exchanges among 40 selected activists, concluding 
that the EDL onlLQHFRPPXQLW\LV³ORRVHO\FRQQHFWHGE\DVPDOOJURXSRI 
RSHUDWRUVLQFRQWURORISXVKLQJFRQWHQWLQDQGRXW´QS2¶&DOODJKDQ 
et al. (2013) examined international relationships established through Twitter 
among far-right groups across eight European countries. Most of the 
users tended to be connected to formal groups that include, in the United 
Kingdom, populist groups like UKIP. The findings suggest the existence of 
stable communities. Some of them focus around local interaction networks. 
Others are transnational in scope, especially in cases of linguistic proximity. 
One aspect that the authors are careful to point out is that it is unclear to 
what extent such patterns of interaction are representative of exchanges that 
occur offline. 
Jackson (2011, p. H[DPLQHVWKH('/¶VRQOLQHSUHVHQFHLQFOXGLQJ 
ZHEVLWHVEORJVDQGVRFLDOPHGLD)DFHERRNFRQFOXGLQJWKDW³QHZPHGLD 
QHWZRUNLQJVLWHVKDYHEHFRPHDYLWDOWRROIRUWKH('/´+RZHYHUZKLOHWKH 
PDLQ('/)DFHERRNSDJHWHQGVWRPDLQWDLQDVWULFW³SDUW\OLQH´RWKHUZHEVLWHV 
and blogs that are more indirectly associated with the organization send 
RXW³DPRUHGLYHUVHVHWRIPHVVDJHV´-DFNVRQS7KH\LQFOXGH 
IRUH[DPSOH³DGYDQFLQJDPRUHQXDQFHGYLHZRIWKHWKUHDWDOOHJHGO\SRVHG 
by Muslims in %ULWDLQ´RUSURPRWLQJ³DQRSHQO\YLROHQWH[WUHPHULJKW-wing 
VHWRIPHVVDJHV´-DFNVRQS$OWKRXJK-DFNVRQILQGVVRPHOHYHO 
of connection between the content on new media and offline activity, the 
question of the relationship between the online and off-line dimensions of 
populism is largely still open. 
Citizens and Populism 
In the main, the UK literature focuses on identifying the supporters of, and on 
explaining voter support for, minor populist parties in the European parliamentary 
elections and in local government elections, especially in 2004 and 
2009 (Borisyuk et al., 2007; Ford, 2010; Goodwin, 2014; John & Margetts, 
2009; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). Only a few studies look at support and 
172 James Stanyer, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen 
supporters outside elections (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Ford & Goodwin, 
2010, 2014; Goodwin, Ford, Duffy, & Robey, 2010; Webb & Bale, 2014). 
The media-effects dimension is glaring in its absence, and within the parameters 
of our search, we could find no studies that examined the effects of 
SRSXOLVWPHVVDJHVRQFLWL]HQV¶HPRWLRQVNQRZOHGJHDQGSHUFHSWLRQV7KDW 
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VDLGWKHUHLVRQHVWXG\WKDWH[DPLQHVWKHLPSDFWRIWKHSUHVVRQFLWL]HQV¶ 
support for populist parties (Ford & Goodwin, 2010). The rest of this section 
provides an overview of the findings of the UK literature. 
Most of the studies seek to explain support for UKIP and the British 
National Party. By contrast, only a few studies focused on the EDL 
(see Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Goodwin et al., 2014) and on the Respect Party 
(Borisyuk et al., 2007). 
These studies provide important insights into supporter demographics 
and the attitudes of supporters of populist political parties. Supporters of 
UKIP, the British National Party, and the EDL are in the majority white and 
male (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; Goodwin 
et al., 2010, 2014; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). UKIP and BNP supporters 
tend to be older or elderly (over 55) (Borisyuk et al., 2007; Whitaker & 
Lynch, 2011) or middle aged (Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010; Ford 
et al., 2012), whereas EDL supporters are young²72% are under 30 
(Bartlett 
& Littler, 2011). Research shows Respect Party supporters tend 
³WREHFRQFHQWUDWHGLQDUHDVZKHUHWKH0XVOLPSRSXODWLRQLVODUJHUDQG 
where othHUHWKQLFJURXSVDUHDOVRORFDWHG´DQGFDQDOVREH³OHIWRIFHQWHU´ 
(Borisyuk et al., 2007, p. 674). 
The studies reveal that BNP supporters are mainly manual working 
class (Borisyuk, et al., 2007; Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; 
Goodwin et al., 2010; Rhodes, 2009, 2011), whereas UKIP supporters are 
mainly skilled working class (Ford et al., 2012) or professionals (Whitaker 
& Lynch, 2011). A large proportion of EDL supporters are unemployed 
(Bartlett & Littler, 2011). The majority of the supporters of UKIP, the British 
National Party, and the EDL have few educational qualifications, with few 
educated beyond the age of 16 (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Ford & Goodwin, 
2010, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2010, 2014). Some studies distinguish between 
core supporters and those who vote for these parties for other reasons, such 
as fear of immigrants (Ford et al., 2012; Kellner, 2009). Ford et al., (2012) 
note, for example, that UKIP core supporters are likely to be more working 
class, more likely to live in the south, and more xenophobic and racist than 
strategic supporters. 
Support for UKIP is mainly focused in the South and the Midlands (Ford 
et al., 2012), whereas support for the BNP has been mainly in the declining 
industrial towns of the North (Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014) 
and in economically deprived urban areas of Wales (Goodwin & Harris, 
2013). EDL supporters live in or near the large conurbations in the United 
Kingdom (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). At the level of the council ward, support 
for UKIP and the BNP is concentrated in traditionally conservative wards 
The United Kingdom 173 
(Borisyuk, et al., 2007) and wards with high levels of immigrants (Ford & 
*RRGZLQ%RULV\XNHWDOSQRWHWKDWWKH5HVSHFW3DUW\¶V 
VXSSRUW³ZDVPRVWNHHQOy observed in London, where the party captured 
PRUHWKDQRQHLQILYHYRWHVLQWZRRIWKHFLW\¶VERURXJKV´ 
As noted, supporters of these parties tend to be dissatisfied with the 
main political parties (Ford et al., 2012; Rhodes, 2009; Whitaker & 
Lynch, 2011) and are cynical about, and distrusting of, the political establishment 
(Bartlett & Litter, 2011; Hayton, 2010). UKIP and BNP supporters 
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YLHZHDFKRWKHU¶VSDUW\IDYRUDEO\+D\WRQ-RKQ	0DUJHWWV 
2009; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). UKIP supporters tend to have a conservative 
family background (Ford et al., 2012) or to be socially conservative 
(Webb & Bale, 2014). EDL supporters viewed the BNP most favorably 
and voted for right-wing parties (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Goodwin et 
al., 2014). Borisyuk et al. (2007) observe an inverse relationship between 
VXSSRUWRI8.,3DQGWKH5HVSHFW3DUW\³>:@KHUHRQHSDUW\GLGUHODWLYHO\ 
ZHOOWKHRWKHUSHUIRUPHGUHODWLYHO\SRRUO\´S7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQW 
issue of concern for supporters of UKIP and the BNP was immigration, 
followed by the European Union (Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; Ford 
et al., 2012; Goodwin & Harris, 2014; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011), while 
for EDL supporters, it was Islam and Muslims (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; 
Goodwin, et al., 2014). Whitaker and Lynch (2011) note that these attitudes 
are more important in explaining support for populist parties than 
demographic factors. 
Some studies provided information about the media consumption patterns 
RIWKHVHSDUWLHV¶VXSSRUWHUV6XSSRUWHUVRI8.,3WKH('/ and the 
BNP are more likely than the electorate at large to read a right-wing tabloid 
newspaper (the Daily Mail, Express, Sun, Star) than a broadsheet newspaper 
(Ford et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2014; Kellner, 2009). Other research 
suggests, in turn, that tabloid readers are most positive toward populist parties 
and broadsheet readers are more negative (Widfeldt & Brandenburg, 
2013). 
Only one study sought to determine if there was any kind of media effect. 
Ford and Goodwin, (2010) tested to see if there is a priming effect of negative 
media coverage of immigrants, asylum seekers, and Muslims on readers 
of the Daily Mail, the Express, and the Sun7KH\IRXQGWKDW³UHDGHUVRI 
these papers are more likely to support the BNP even after controlling for 
their sRFLDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV´S7KH\QRWH 
while it is possible that this is a selection effect, with xenophobic voters 
attracted to papers that reflect their views, this finding suggests 
that high-profile, anti-immigrant campaigns such as those appearing 
in these newspapers could promote support for the extreme right, a 
finding mirrored in studies of ERP [extreme right populist] support 
elsewhere in Europe. 
(Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 15) 
174 James Stanyer, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen 
Summary and Recent Developments 
Empirical research on populist political actors in the United Kingdom shows 
that they share certain stylistic traits, such as drawing contrasts between 
the elite and the people, anti-system challenges, and the use of simplistic, 
emotional language. Right-wing populists also seek to construct out-groups. 
Some of these traits can be seen in the communication of mainstream parties. 
Different electoral strategies, however, make large mainstream parties 
select different tools from the populist communication toolbox than small 
populist parties. No studies have yet investigated factors such as party size 
or position of power to enable a distinction between populist and other 
small-party types. Future research should include comparative studies with 
a systemic basis to investigate the relationship between media, political systems, 
and populist communication. 
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Overall studies on populism and the media focus on (a) how the media, 
especially the press, cover populist groups and the themes associated with 
them (typically racism or Islamophobia) and (b) the engagement of media 
outlets in populist communication and the use of the Internet, particularly 
social media. Such studies, however, do not explore the media/populism link 
across the whole spectrum of parties and media outlets. Furthermore, the 
few European comparative studies are descriptive rather than explanatory 
of national or regional differences. 
Research on citizens and populism shows that supporters of populist 
parties share many demographic and attitudinal features. The supporters 
of UKIP, the EDL, and the BNP are mainly white, male, working class, 
politically conservative, and middle-aged or older, with limited educational 
qualifications. They are concerned mainly with immigration, the European 
Union, and Islam and are dissatisfied with the existing parties and the political 
establishment. Supporters of the Respect Party, however, are from ethnic 
minority communities in urban areas or are left-of-center politically. Few 
studies explored the impact of populist media messages on citizens, and 
those that did have not shed much light on this matter. These areas are 
important for future research in the United Kingdom. 
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